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The Value of Currency 
PATRICKWILSON 
ABSTRACT 
MAINTAININGCURRENCY-KEEPING up-is an  occupational re-
quirement for knowledge workers which is backed by ethical, legal, 
and social expectations and powerfully reinforced by the incentive 
to preserve the value of one’s human capital-i.e., one’s stock of 
knowledge and skill. But no particular level of currency is socially 
required; the levels actually attained and the costs (mainly in time) 
paid can vary enormously. These costs are maintenance costs; the 
value of the stock maintained does not necessarily increase and may 
even decline. Evaluation of embodied stocks of knowledge is holistic 
and coarse, insensitive to small changes, a fact which helps explain 
the vagueness of social requirements of currency. The value of 
individual inputs (e.g., reading an article) can ordinarily not be 
measured. 
INTRODUCTION 
When people ask for information about something, the 
assumption is that they want current information, that is, information 
about how things are now-just as one assumes they want correct 
information rather than misinformation. Unless otherwise specified, 
information means current information in the sense of information 
about the current state of the world. Even when people ask specifically 
about the past, one assumes they want to know what is currently 
known or thought about the past and not what people used to think. 
And if they ask about something that is presumably unchanging, 
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like the value of some physical constant, again they want to know 
what the current view of the matter is, not what used to be thought. 
The assumption of currency is the default assumption; if old 
information is wanted, a special effort has to be made to make clear 
that that is what one wants. Of course, old information may still 
be good-it may describe something that has not changed or represent 
a view that we still hold. Information does not have to be new to 
be current, but we will ordinarily want to know about the current 
status of any old piece of information. 
CURRENCYOR KEEPINGUP 
The intimate relation between information and currency can be 
seen clearly if we consider the concepts of staying current or keeping 
up. Suppose one starts with a certain picture of a situation-e.g., 
the state of the local school system, the current situation in Turkey, 
the state of the mind-body problem in philosophy, what is known 
about the causes of dyslexia. If one is kept informed, over time the 
initial picture will change gradually as new reports come in. The 
process whereby new reports modify a prior picture is wickedly 
complicated; it certainly does not involve automatic acceptance and 
direct use of the contents of new reports; one does not have to believe 
everything one hears, and the modification of an initial picture of 
a situation may not correspond to what the author of the report 
wanted or expected. One might even reject or ignore most of the 
reports and interpret the rest in ways that would surprise their 
producers (compare Machlup, 1980, p. 57). But, as a result of 
interpretation and evaluation of new information, the initial picture 
gradually will change. Much may be unchanged; information that 
was part of the picture in earlier times may still be part of the current 
informed picture. Or everything may have changed. If you are looking 
for someone who is well informed about a situation, you are ordinarily 
looking for one whose picture is current, up to date, a picture of 
what the situation looks like now. This may not always be the case. 
Sometimes asking for current information might just be a request 
for the most recent reports or the most recent news. But ordinarily 
the request for information is a request for what is now known, 
and, in that sense, information is understood to mean: current 
information. So to ask about the value of currency is just one way 
of asking about the value of information, and to ask about the value 
of being current is another way of approaching the same question. 
It is not the only way (for some others, see King, 1982; Repo, 1989), 
but it is an especially interesting one for reasons that should become 
clear as this discussion evolves. 
Everyone of ordinary intelligence tries to keep up with changes 
in some part of the world around them; at a minimum, everyone 
tries to stay aware of what is happening in their immediate 
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environment-home, neighborhood, workplace. Growing up, we 
learn what kinds of things one has to keep an eye on, look out for, 
pay attention to. This rudimentary form of keeping up is mostly 
automatic and effortless. It is a monitoring of the environment that 
is not so different from what humans in pre-agricultural and pre- 
industrial societies had to do, though perhaps less depends on it  
for us, our lives mostly being less precarious than theirs. 
Almost everyone tries to keep up with some part of life beyond 
the immediate environment, but everyone differs in pattern of interest 
and habits of pursuing currency. There is one general principle of 
the distribution of interest and attention-egocentrism. Information 
that appears to be practically relevant to the individual’s situation 
and interests and concerns is sought or at least accepted. This is 
really just an extension of the primitive practice of monitoring the 
immediate environment; we monitor a larger environment, looking 
for dangers and opportunities. But how much wider the environment 
we attend to is largely u p  to us; some look scarcely further than 
their immediate neighborhood, some try to watch the whole world. 
Beyond monitoring for relevant changes that might occur anywhere, 
we all have patterns of avocational, recreational, ideological, and 
cultural interests which may lead us to follow events in one or another 
subworld more or less intently. Again, i t  is up to us to decide what 
spheres of life we will follow and how closely. 
But it is not always our decision whether or not to keep up 
with a sphere of activity. The social world imposes requirements 
on its members, and currency is a requirement imposed on occupants 
of some kinds of social positions, particularly occupational positions. 
However, the way it is imposed and the way it is attained differ. 
A worker may be instructed by a supervisor, bringing the worker 
up to date on what must be known; an executive may have a staff 
of experts whose job it is to bring the executive up to date in a 
particular situation. Neither worker nor executive may need to do 
anything to keep themselves up to date; i t  is someone else’s job to 
keep them, or bring them, u p  to date. But for one large class of 
workers, keeping up to date is their personal responsibility. These 
are the knowledge workers-i.e., knowledge producers (those active 
in research and development) and members of the professions. 
Professionals of ten express discomfort or embarrassment at being 
unable to keep up with their fields; that kind of reaction is significant. 
Failure to keep up is not just failure to do what one would like 
to do or thinks i t  would be useful to do; i t  is failure to do what 
one is socially obliged to do. Professional codes of ethics routinely 
include a requirement of keeping up with the field-an ethical 
requirement not just a suggestion for more successful practice (Gorlin, 
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1990). Ethics are reinforced by the law-a malpractice suit may be 
the result of failure to keep up  (Keeton, 1984). Social pressure reinforces 
the demand of ethics and law-one does not want to appear to one’s 
peers to be behind the times or to be out of touch with the current 
world because that is likely to expose one to contempt. There is 
as well a kind of “logical” pressure; theories of rational belief 
formation and rational decision making sometimes include a 
requirement of “total relevant evidence” for rational belief and action 
(Goldman, 1986, pp. 204-07).That kind of requirement certainly 
implies a need for awareness of current relevant evidence. Such a 
requirement may be interpreted as an extreme idealization of what 
we think of as part of common sense. We are likely to view others 
as simply crazy if they conspicuously neglect to gather or use current 
information in serious situations, and it seems to us (or to us 
professionals) no more than plain common sense to keep up  with 
developments in fields in which one works and whose best current 
knowledge one needs in order to practice one’s profession successfully. 
But there is, in addition, a very strong private motivation for 
maintaining currency-the preservation of self or of capital. A 
knowledge worker’s principal capital asset is likely to be his or her 
own stock of specialized knowledge and skill; i t  is what one has 
to offer the world and one’s occupation, status, and income depend 
on it. Preserving the value of one’s “human capital” is a form of 
self-preservation. Keeping u p  to date is an important aspect of capital 
preservation, for what the world wants is the services of brains not 
only well trained and well stocked with knowledge but well adjusted 
to the current state of the world and not just to earlier states. And 
that implies knowing what is currently known that is relevant to 
the practice of one’s profession. So, for the knowledge worker, currency 
is not an option but a requirement, a social requirement which one 
has the best of private reasons for meeting. 
Of course currency is not a concern only for knowledge workers, 
but for most others i t  is not a social requirement that one keep up  
with particular areas of activity. It may be necessary to catch up 
from time to time: anyone who tries to take seriously the rationality 
requirement on decision and belief formation will have a need for 
current information at decision time-but they can get i t  then by 
catching up. Anyone participating in a competitive field of activity 
such as politics or business or warfare will have a recognized need 
for current information-relevant activity in that field. But the 
corporate executive will employ others to gather most of the relevant 
information that cannot be gathered informally by personal 
observation; those others are the ones who stay current over most 
realms (see Mintzberg, 1973 on managerial work and its currency 
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requirements). Or consider national security-enormous intelligence 
organizations full of analysts as well as spies trying to stay current 
so as to be ready to brief their superiors if  and when the need arises. 
The politicians and administrators whom they brief have their own 
currency requirements; they are unlikely to be successful unless they 
maintain current knowledge of the state of play in their own fields 
of competition (and in this they are like players in any other 
competitive field-e.g., scientists [Bourdieu, 19911)-but that is simple 
prudence. For the intelligence analysts, “foreign currency” is a job 
requirement, what they are paid to maintain. 
For the broad class of knowledge workers, then, the value of 
currency is socially determined. Currency is not an option but a 
requirement. The costs of maintaining currency are the costs of 
maintaining one’s status, one’s standing, and the economic value 
of one’s human capital. 
CURRENCYVARIABLES 
But if currency is a social requirement for knowledge workers, 
it is a particularly vague and indefinite requirement. Currency has 
several variables. One is, of course, extent-i.e., the size and shape 
of the areas or spheres of the world about which one tries to maintain 
current knowledge. Another is what we can call scale using a 
cartographic analogy. A small-scale map shows a large area but little 
detail, a large-scale map shows a small area in great detail. One may 
have current knowledge of an area but only on a small scale-i.e., 
aware of major features but ignorant of fine detail. Alternatively, 
one may have large-scale knowledge which is dense with detail. 
Another variable involving currency is de$th of understanding; our 
grasp of a situation can be superficial or deep, as in the difference 
between bare awareness of a change versus extensive grasp of the 
implications of the change (scale and depth are independent variables, 
alas). Another currency variable is timeliness or delay; “current” is 
as ambiguous as “now,” which can mean a time span from “this 
very instant” to “these days,” and one may claim to be current without 
claiming to have information about what is happening in “real 
time”-i.e., r ight now. A requirement of keeping u p  with 
developments in one’s profession is not unambiguously a requirement 
to know what is going on today that is new, nor a requirement of 
deep understanding, nor a requirement of an exact scale of knowledge, 
nor a requirement of knowledge of every nook and cranny of the 
profession, nor is it a requirement to maintain the same level of 
currency over all parts of the field for which one is responsible. One 
need not be expected, for example, to have an equally deep 
understanding of all parts of a field or knowledge of the same scale 
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over a whole territory; specialization in fact means large-scale 
knowledge of relatively small areas, smaller scale knowledge of 
surrounding areas. So there is a question of what constitutes enough 
currency to satisfy the requirements of a professional position. 
There is unlikely to be much argument that different people 
arrive at very different answers to this question. For every professional 
for whom maintaining currency is a burden and information overload 
a serious affliction, there must be at least one for whom currency 
is simply no problem at all. A lonely scientist reports that: “We’re 
in the forefront without any effort whatsoever!” (Palmer, 1991, p. 
268) but, even where there is a lot to do, it can happen that thin 
and superficial information works well enough, the cost of ignorance 
turns out not to be great, and, if necessary, bluffing works nicely. 
The most scrupulous is likely to be the most troubled by the currency 
requirement, overinterpreting it  to mean large-scale knowledge in 
depth of wider areas than there is time to attain. But neither law 
nor ethics requires any particular level of currency (the currency 
requirement on professionals such as doctors seems to be interpreted 
very gently by courts; one is not expected to be informed at the highest 
level [Keeton, 1984, p. 1891). Self-preservation or preservation of one’s 
own human capital raises strategic questions that can be answered 
differently with plausibility and does not invariably call for high 
levels of currency (one might rationally decide to run down the value 
of one’s capital stock, for instance, in anticipation of changing 
occupations or roles). So, while maintaining currency is not optional 
but mandatory, the level of currency to be maintained is generally 
not prescribed. Many different levels of currency would appear to 
satisfy social requirements. Extent, depth, scale, and delay are 
variables that can be given a wide range of “acceptable” values. One 
may deliberately choose not to keep up with some segments of one’s 
field of interest in favor of catching up  later if and when the need 
arises (there is much more to be said on the topic of keeping up  
versus catching up, but we will not discuss it here). Rationality might 
appear to demand the highest possible degree of currency, but its 
requirement is impossible to meet and hence is self-canceling 
(Cherniak, 1986). The social requirement of currency allows almost 
indefinite interpretation with potentially huge differences in 
knowledge acquired. 
And different people pay very different prices for the currency 
they attain. Time is the principal cost for most knowledge workers- 
we are not considering payment for national or industrial espionage 
or for purchase of proprietary know-how, for instance, where large 
sums of money are involved. For most professionals, the relevant 
current knowledge is in the public domain, professional associations 
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have positive incentives to facilitate its communication to their 
members, and money costs are, if not negligible, still not major 
barriers to the attainment of the expected currency (given, that is, 
the availability of adequate libraries). The time costs involved 
obviously depend on the pace of change in the field(s) one is trying 
to keep up with as well as on the level of currency sought. If one 
works in a fast moving field which changes rapidly, one may pay 
a big price in time in order to keep current, while if one works 
in a slow field, the price of currency may be almost negligible (see 
Becher, 1989 on “urban” and “rural” research fields and on the 
comparative rarity of the “urban” style [p. 1571). There is not much 
good information about the amount of time people in knowledge 
occupations actually spend in keeping up; for all the talk of overload 
(e.g., Bernier, 1978; Klapp, 1978; Weick, 1970), i t  is not clear that 
i t  is a widespread problem among professionals in general. But the 
differences from field to field must be very considerable as well as 
among individuals in a field. 
THEEFFECTOF CURRENCY 
What we must be clear about is that what one is buying with 
one’s expenditure of time is, in the first instance, simply the state 
of being current, which implies nothing at all about an increase 
in the value of the stock of knowledge kept current. Maintaining 
currency helps keep the value of that stock from diminishing; i t  does 
not automatically increase its value. There is a way in which the 
value of the stock might increase simply as a consequence of keeping 
up-a field-dependent way. One may be working in a progressive 
field, which, as a field, is acquiring new abilities and learning how 
to deal with its objects more successfully; not just one individual, 
but the field as a whole may be stronger now than it was a year 
or a decade ago. In that case, keeping up  with the field means that 
one’s own professional capacities are stronger now than a year or 
a decade ago, hence (depending on the field) possibly seen as more 
useful by others, hence, perhaps, worth more to others who may 
recognize increased capacity by increased financial reward. But this 
may not be the result. Consumer products often get simultaneously 
better and cheaper, and so might professional services. And either 
falling demand for services or an increase in  the supply of 
professionals offering the service could reduce the rewards even for 
an improved service (Machlup, 1984, p. 560). Since there may easily 
be sharp differences of opinion over whether or not a field is actually 
progressing and a service is in fact improved, or indeed is of any 
value at all (for example, see Malkiel, 1985 or later editions on security 
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analysts), insiders proud of their augmented abilities may face 
growing skepticism and declining job offers. 
An individual might “beat the field”; one who spends time in 
studying, observing, and practicing might deepen her or his 
understanding and perhaps also improve capacity even though the 
field as a whole was not progressing. The professional’s stock of 
specialized knowledge and skill is not an inert repository as the word 
stock unfortunately suggests but is rather information embodied in 
an active cognitive system; in the course of keeping up-though not 
only as a result of keeping up-the system may get better, more 
powerful, and hence more useful, and perhaps there will be a monetary 
payoff for the increase in usefulness. But there are no guarantees 
that effort at maintaining currency will lead to an increase in the 
value of a cognitive system; a field may be getting worse rather than 
better, and an individual might go off on cranky tangents and lose 
credibility. Or one may be interested in a field of activity where 
nothing is happening-one stays current by continuing to look for 
something to happen but nothing does. So the value to others of 
a stock of knowledge embodied in a professional at the end of a 
period of time during which the individual has been keeping up  
may be the same, or greater, or less than it  was at the beginning. 
Current does not mean better. 
The chanciness of benefits arising from currency becomes even 
more apparent when we look at i t  from another angle. What is being 
evaluated here is the whole stock of knowledge representing some 
professional capacity embodied in a cognitive system; this is holistic 
evaluation. But what about the value of the things learned along 
the way in the course of maintaining currency? Surely i t  must be 
possible to estimate the value of the contributions of this journal 
article and that book, or of this theory and that piece of empirical 
research? Book reviewers seem to do it  all the time: “a significant 
contribution to our understanding of the field.” Rational action is 
presumably based on estimates of benefit; we spend time reading 
what we think will be of use to us, and we are bound to have views, 
after the fact, about whether we have been wasting our time. One 
would then expect that we could say something, after the fact, about 
the utility of the things we read, item by item. 
One can certainly give an evaluation of what one has read- 
e.g., interesting, boring, probably not true, dead wrong, not worth 
thinking about further, and so on. But evaluations of what one has 
read are not descriptions of changes in one’s own stock of knowledge, 
and descriptions of changes are not descriptions of the magnitude 
of benefits resulting from the change. In fact, the main benefit of 
reading in some period of time might be to show that no change 
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was called for in one’s stock of knowledge. One reads some papers 
recently published on one’s own specialty, for instance, and concludes 
that they have contributed nothing and call for no changes in one’s 
own views. One did not read them because one expected benefit; 
one read them because, being in one’s own specialty, they were 
mandatory reading. They happened to lead to no change in views. 
Other readings will lead to changes-reports of changes in a situation 
that lead to updating of one’s picture of a situation, for example; 
the benefit is simply that a picture has been kept up to date in some 
respect, though not structurally altered. Other readings may lead to 
additions to a repertory: new knowledge that may be of use sometime 
in the future. It may not be clear if and when the time for use will 
come. Other readings may supply what one thinks it is good to know 
even though one cannot say how or when it might make a difference 
that one knows the new material. Consider a week’s incoming flow 
of information just in the form of written documents-memos, letters, 
in-house reports, published books and articles, and so on (for a very 
close look at some physicists’ reading, see Bazerman, 1988, chap. 8). 
Documents may be quickly scanned and assigned to one of these 
categories: (1) “must” reading to be dealt with as soon as possible; 
(2) of potential interest to be read now if time permits, otherwise 
later; (3) noted and filed for future reference in case of need; and 
(4)of no interest therefore to be discarded and forgotten. Much of 
the mandatory reading in category one might consist of routine 
updating-for instance, replacing old names and dates with new 
ones-no change of structure at all yet a necessary replacement of 
old with new. Much of the information might, on reading, be rejected 
and forgotten as worthless yet the time spent would not be described 
as time wasted if the things read were things one clearly had to read 
(it  is the cynical but common professional judgment that most of 
what is published in one’s field is trash). Some things might contain 
information of more or less precisely foreseeable future use-e.g., 
a new technique for use in certain special cases, data one can use 
in a report one is writing. The optional reading might be of things 
one thinks i t  good to know though one foresees no specific use. 
Information has generic utility if  it strengthens one’s understanding, 
but it may be quite impossible to tell how or where or how much 
one’s understanding has been improved. Much ordinary information 
intake has generic rather than specific utility thus escaping any ready 
measurement of impact. 
The cumulative effect of a myriad of encounters with the literature 
in the course of trying to keep up with a field may or may not turn 
out to be a better professional performer, but, at best, it is the 
cumulative effect that can be crudely measured and not the individual 
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encounters. If we thought that the benefits of reading would consist 
of improvements in cognitive structure or in performance ability, 
we must change our minds. It is a reasonable guess that the usual 
change of either cognitive structure or of performance ability as a 
result of reading an individual article or participating in a single 
conversation is vanishingly small-perhaps zero is the modal effect. 
When one thinks that a reading has had an impact, it may not be 
possible even to guess the size or value of the impact. There are 
some exceptions. Very occasionally a minor or even a major cognitive 
revolution can be brought about by reading a single document. Major 
changes in capacity resulting from learning a new branch of study 
or a new sort of technique may be easily observed and evaluated. 
But judgments of the extent or strength of a cognitive capacity are 
inevitably coarse and insensitive to small changes. Overall evaluation 
of the knowledge and capacity of professionals in and out of academia 
is often highly uncertain and contentious even for peers and out 
of the question for most who are not peers. Minor changes are not 
going to be detectable. The only benefit from most readings will 
be an imperceptibly small contribution to maintenance of the currency 
of one’s capital asset. 
But the same considerations raise additional doubts about the 
results of progress in a field as discussed earlier; spectacular major 
progress may be easy to see and reward, and minor improvements 
hard to detect and evaluate. And they also go a long way toward 
explaining the vagueness of the social requirement of currency as 
noted earlier; even if one could precisely specify levels of currency, 
one could not precisely establish that lower or higher levels made 
a definite difference in performance. The vagueness of the requirement 
of currency corresponds to the insensitivity and coarseness of 
evaluation of stocks of knowledge. And that, in turn, explains the 
unavailability of an exact answer to the question, How much is 
enough? and so explains why there might be a kind of professional 
information anxiety (Wurman, 1989) due to the inability to tell how 
much, if any, difference it makes that one does or does not spend 
more time at keeping up. 
CONCLUSION 
We have concentrated on knowledge workers and their 
obligations to keep up, and there is a good reason for this. From 
a pragmatic point of view, no information does any good until 
embodied in cognitive systems and put to work. We are long past 
the time when information could easily be embodied in any cognitive 
system and put to work; much of the information produced in the 
contemporary world is unintelligible except to a handful of specialists 
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and can only be appreciated by a specialized interpretative device, 
which is what the cognitive systems we have been discussing 
essentially are (interpretation rather than decision being their basic 
cognitive role). “Economists and other social scientists will benefit 
enormously.. .if they drop their conceptualisations of science and 
technology as activities producing easily transmissible and applicable 
‘information,’ and recognize them instead as search processes and 
skills embodied in individuals and institutions” (Pavitt, 1991, p. 118); 
analogous advice applies to other groups of scholars and in relation 
to professions as well as research and development (R&D).The only 
ones who can maintain a high degree of currency over a field are 
those who have already invested heavily in acquisition of that field’s 
stock of knowledge and in developing the relevant interpretative 
ability. And the current status of old information is mainly left to 
be determined by the same specialized interpretative devices that are 
responsible for producing and using new information; currency judges 
currency. A human capital approach to the evaluation of currency 
of specialized stocks of knowledge is thus almost irresistible. 
We have concentrated on the professions, but the approach should 
be equally applicable to other specialized occupational stocks of 
knowledge and skill. But what about nonoccupational knowledge? 
We argued that currency is a social requirement primarily for 
knowledge workers. This overstates the case. In a given social milieu, 
there may be strong expectations that one will be well informed about 
particular social realms-sports, for instance, or ballet and opera, 
or current national and international politics. In such cases, currency 
may have social value for the individual as well as satisfying an 
intrinsic interest. But, apart from this, the only kind of currency 
that may seem worthwhile is currency over areas of immediate 
practical relevance to the individual (Wilson, 1973)-and those may 
seem to the outside observer to be pitifully narrow and small. People 
manage to live in what are, in effect, microscopic worlds, excluding 
and ignoring practically all of the world around them. One could 
investigate the costs of such narrowness but that would take a quite 
different approach to the value of information and of currency. That 
should not be surprising; evaluation is an interminable process, 
reflecting radically different interests and objectives and calling for 
(and calling forth) a great profusion of techniques. 
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